Russian formations have only three-quarters the number of combat vehicles as their U.S. Only brigades have an equivalent logistics capability, but it’s not an exact comparison. Inside maneuver units, Russian sustainment units are a size lower than their Western counterparts. Russian army logistics forces are not designed for a large-scale ground offensive far from their railroads. Railroads and Russian Logistics Capabilities Committing to a decisive battle at the frontier would play directly into Russian hands, allowing a shorter supply to compensate for their logistic shortfalls. This involves drawing the Russian army deep into NATO territory and stretching Russian supply lines to the maximum while targeting logistics and transportation infrastructure such as trucks, railroad bridges, and pipelines. NATO planners should develop plans focusing on exploiting Russian logistic challenges rather than trying to address the disparity in combat power. The Russian Aerospace Forces (with a sizable tactical bomber and attack aircraft force) and attack helicopters can also pick up fire support to alleviate artillery ammunition consumption. The Russian army has the combat power to capture the objectives envisioned in a fait accompli scenario, but it does not have the logistic forces to do it in a single push without a logistical pause to reset its sustainment infrastructure. As a result, a large land grab is unrealistic as a fait accompli. In an initial offensive - depending on the fighting involved - Russian forces might reach early objectives, but logistics would impose requirements for operational pauses. While the Russian army definitely has the combat power to achieve these scenarios, does Russia have the logistics force structure to support these operations? The short answer is not in the timelines envisioned by Western wargames. While that scenario should, of course, be studied, the concern about the feasibility of a fait accompli in the form of a major invasion still stands. Some analysts have argued that these seizures are much more likely to be small in size, limited to one or two towns. This creates a dilemma for NATO: launch a costly counter-attack and risk heavy casualties and possibly a nuclear crisis or accept a Russian fait accompli and undermine faith in the credibility of the alliance. Most of these wargames, such as RAND’s Baltic study, focus on fait accompli, an attack by the Russian government aimed at seizing terrain - then quickly digging in.
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